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COMMENTS ON DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-SYMBOLIC
SPEECH-Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence"-In
the case of Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, the
Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision,3 held that certain National
Park Service regulations, which were applied to prohibit pro-
posed sleeping demonstrations by the Community for Creative
Non-Violence did not violate the first amendment." This deci-
sion raises a question as to the inevitable "chilling effect" on the
use of sleeping as symbolic speech in public forums under the
first amendment' that goes beyond the specific facts of the case.
The implications of Clark are not easily discernible. In light
of the prolific first amendment cases handed down through the
years, the decision may be seen by some as a legal aberration. To
others, however, the decision signifies an alarming trend by the
Supreme Court towards the erosion of rights in the free speech
arena. It is for this reason that the vigorous dissenting opinion
of Justice Marshall will be of particular import to this comment.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) is an
unincorporated religious association that works on behalf of the
1. The petitioner to the Supreme Court is William P. Clark, Secretary of the Interior.
The four previous suits before the federal courts were filed against "James Watt, Secre-
tary of the Interior." Only weeks after the Court's October 1983 term, Watt was replaced
as Secretary by Clark.
2. 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984).
3. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court, and was joined by Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Blackmun and Stevens; Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate con-
currence, Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Brennan.
4. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3065.
5. The first amendment provides in part that: Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, . . . or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
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poor and homeless by supplying food, shelter and other assis-
tance to them. In order to draw attention to the desperate
plight of the homeless, CCNV planned a demonstration in La-
fayette Park7 in Washington, D.C. The demonstration was to
take place from November 26, 1981 through March 20, 1982.8 In
the fall of 1981, CCNV applied to the National Park Service9
(Park Service) for a permit. The Service was informed that
CCNV would provide the demonstrators with shelter in the form
of tents, sleeping bags and blankets.' 0 The Park Service granted
CCNV a seven-day renewable permit for a demonstration that
would include the erection of nine "symbolic" tents," but de-
nied the group permission to sleep in the tents, citing a Park
Service regulation which restricted "camping" to areas desig-
nated by the Superintendent of National Capital Parks.'2 Lafay-
ette Park was not a designated camping area.'"
After it received the Park Service's denial, CCNV filed suit
in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to en-
join the Park Service from denying them permission to demon-
strate in the above manner. 14 The district court granted CCNV's
motion for summary judgment, 15 and the Park Service appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia avoided
the constitutional question presented by the case merely by in-
voking the principle that courts have a duty to exercise self-re-
straint by not passing upon the constitutionality of a statute or
regulation, if it is possible to construe the statute or regulation
6. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 670 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (D.C. Cir.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Watt I].
7. President Jefferson set aside seven acres in the heart of Washington, D.C. as a
park for the use of residents and visitors. It is located across Pennsylvania Avenue from
the White House. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3067.
8. Watt I, 670 F.2d at 1214.
9. Since 1983, the Interior Department, through the National Park Service, has been
responsible for managing and maintaining all of the national parks, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, la-
1, 3 (1983).
10. Watt I, 670 F.2d at 1214.
11. Id. at 1215. Permission to erect the symbolic tents was granted pursuant to 36
C.F.R. § 50.19(e)(8) (1982), which states in pertinent part that "temporary structures
may be erected for the purposes of symbolizing a message . .. .
12. Watt I, 670 F.2d at 1214 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1985)).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1214-15.
15. Id. at 1215.
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in a way that would avoid the constitutional question.16 The
court interpreted the Park Service's regulations in such a way as
would allow CCNV to sleep in the tents as an intrinsic part of
their protest against governmental policies which, it was alleged,
contributed to the lack of shelter.17 To support this interpreta-
tion, the court also relied on a policy statement issued by the
Park Service contemporaneously with the promulgation of its
camping regulations. Thus, the court concluded, the regulations
actually allowed plaintiffs to sleep in the tents as part of their
protest and the Park Service had merely misinterpreted its own
regulations.'8 As the court asserted, "in this case sleeping itself
may express the message that these persons are homeless and so
have nowhere else to go."' 9
Within a few months of this decision, the Park Service re-
vised its regulations.20 Its new regulations prohibited the act of
sleeping in national parks "when it reasonably appears, in light
of all the circumstances, that the participants in conducting
these activities are in fact using the area as a living accommoda-
tion regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of
any other activities in which they may also be engaging."'2' The
Park Service justified this prohibition as a means of protecting
parks from "activities for which they are not suited and the im-
pacts of which they cannot sustain.
22
After the Park Service revised its regulation, CCNV applied
for a permit to stage a demonstration that would include sleep-
ing in symbolic tents during the winter of 1982-83.2s The pur-
16. Id. at 1216 and n.19 (citing U.S. v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980) and Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
17. Id.
18. Id. The policy statement describes the scope of 36 C.F.R. § 50.19(e)(8) (1985):
"Camping is prohibited in all park areas except those specifically designated as official
campsites . . . .The National Park Service does permit the use of symbolic campsites
reasonably related to First Amendment activities." 46 Fed. Reg. 55, 961 (Nov. 13, 1981)
(emphasis added).
19. Id. at 1216-17.
20. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3073 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall's footnote 1 states
that the regulations were amended in direct response to Watt I. The revised regulations
appear at 47 Fed. Reg. 24,299 (June 4, 1982).
21. 47 Fed. Reg. 24,302 (1982) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 50.19 § 50.27 (1982)).
22. 47 Fed. Reg. 24,301 (1982).
23. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 587 (D.C. Cir.
1983) [hereinafter cited as Watt II].
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pose of the demonstration was identical to that of the previous
demonstration; that is, to impress the plight of the homeless
upon the Reagan Administration, Congress, and the public.2 4
The Park Service granted CCNV a permit to stage a round-the-
clock demonstration and to set up two symbolic campsites, one
on the Washington, D.C. Mall with a maximum of 100 partici-
pants and 40 tents, and one in Lafayette Park with approxi-
mately 50 participants and 20 tents. 2 But, relying upon the
newly revised anti-camping regulations, the Park Service denied
a permit for the demonstrators to actually sleep in the tents.2 6
CCNV then applied for a court order invalidating the permit's
prohibition against sleeping in the tents as an unconstitutional
infringement upon its first amendment rights of freedom of
speech.27 The prohibition, CCNV argued, struck at the core mes-
sage the demonstrators wished to convey-that homeless people
have no permanent place to sleep.2 8
After cross motions for summary judgment were filed, the
district court held in favor of the Park Service.2 9 This time, the
court emphasized the fact that on its permit application CCNV
had stressed the necessity of providing sleeping accommodations
so as to attract homeless persons to participate in the demon-
stration.30 This, according to the court, indicated that CCNV's
motive in seeking sleeping accommodations was to attract par-
ticipants for its demonstration and was not solely to express a
message."1 The court added that because the Park Service regu-
lations were neutral in content, they did not violate the first
amendment.3 2
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a
sharply divided en banc opinion," held that if the regulations
24. Id. at 587.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Clark, 105 S. Ct. at 3068. ("The 11 judges produced 6 opinions. Six of the
judges believed that application of the regulations so as to prevent sleeping in tents
would infringe the demonstrators' first amendment right of free expression. The other
five judges disagreed and would have sustained the regulations as applied to the pro-
488 [Vol. III
COMMENTS
were applied so as to prevent sleeping in the tents, there would
be an infringement of the demonstrators' first amendment right
of free expression. 4 The court began by recognizing that first
amendment activities may be subject to reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions. Yet the court concluded that the Park
Service failed to establish that the asserted governmental inter-
est-maintaining the beauty of the parks-would be furthered
by forbidding the demonstrators to sleep in the tents." Once
again, the Park Service appealed.
The Supreme Court granted the government's petition for
certiorari, and held that the revised Park Service regulations did
not violate CCNV's first amendment rights. 6 The Court found
that the revised Park Service regulations are indeed reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions upon any type of expres-
sion, whether oral, written, or symbolized by conduct.3 7 The reg-
ulations are content neutral, said the Court, and furthermore
leave open ample alternative methods of communicating
CCNV's intended message regarding the homeless.38 According
to the Court, the regulations are narrowly tailored so as to focus
on the government's substantial interest in maintaining the
parks in an attractive and intact condition, so they are readily
available to all who wish to enjoy them.3 ' Lastly, the court
stated, the regulations are sustainable because they meet the
standards for a valid regulation of expressive conduct.4 0
II. BACKGROUND
For over a half century, the Supreme Court has grappled
with problems involving two of the freedoms guaranteed by the
first amendment-the freedoms of speech and of peaceable as-
sembly. Difficulty arises because the exercise of these freedoms
often conflict with the legitimate state interest in keeping public
order. Or, as one commentator has simply stated, "[f]or each
posed demonstration).
34. Id.
35. Watt 11, 703 F.2d at 598-99.
36. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3066.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3066-67.
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group of demonstrators that wishes to assemble on a street cor-
ner and disseminate its ideas, there is always a public official
responsible for assuring that the demonstration will be peaceful
and will not disrupt competing activities."4
Conduct that can be defined as symbolic expression
presents an added difficulty in first amendment analysis. Does
the first amendment protect expressive non-verbal conduct?
And, if so, when, if ever, may the government infringe upon that
protected right? On various occasions, the Supreme Court has
suggested some answers to these fundamental questions.
The Supreme Court, in Stromberg v. California,42 held that
certain non-verbal conduct is protected under the first amend-
ment. The Court therefore struck down a California statute that
prohibited the displaying of a red flag when the display was
meant to symbolize opposition to organized government.43 In
Stromberg, the appellant was convicted of violating this Califor-
nia statute, and appealed alleging a violation of his first amend-
ment rights. In holding for the appellant, the Court excised the'
clause in the statute that condemned the displaying of a flag "as
a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized govern-
ment" because, according to the Court, that clause might be
construed in such a way as to include "peaceful and orderly op-
position to government by legal means and within constitutional
limitations."' 5
Some 35 years later, the Supreme Court was again faced
with a case involving expressive non-verbal conduct and again
affirmed the protected nature of such conduct. In Brown v. Lou-
isiana,46 the Court asserted that first amendment rights are not
confined to verbal expression, but "embrace appropriate types of
action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and or-
derly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a
place where the protestant has every right to be, the unconstitu-
tional segregation of public facilities. '47 The action at issue in
41. Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the
Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFFALO L. REv. 175 (1983).
42. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
43. Id. at 369-70.
44. Id. at 361.
45. Id. at 369.
46. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
47. Id. at 141-42.
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Brown involved five black men who had protested the segrega-
tional practices of Louisiana public libraries by having one of
them sit down in a library while the others stood near him.4 '8
Three years after Brown was decided, the Court again consid-
ered the issue of suppression of expressive non-verbal action. In
Tinker v. Des Moines School District,4 the Court held that the
suspension of junior high school students for wearing black arm-
bands violated the students' first amendment rights because the
armbands were intended to symbolize the students' opposition
to the Vietnam War." After noting the fact that the school's
rule against the wearing of such armbands was promulgated in
anticipation of the organized student protest, the Court asserted
that what was being suppressed was not "actually or potentially
disruptive conduct," but instead something that was nearly
"pure speech." 1
The Tinker decision is significant for two reasons. First, the
Court noted that the school officials acted out of "an urgent wish
to avoid the controversy which might result from the expres-
sion."52 This subjective fear was not a valid reason for infringing
upon a protected freedom, said the Court." Second, the Court
found it relevant that the school officials' rule lacked content
neutrality in that it did not prohibit the wearing of all symbols
of politically controversial significance.54 In fact, the Court
found that evidence of students wearing political campaign but-
tons and Nazi Iron Crosses abounded. ' 55 The Court affirmed
that it would not tolerate such blatant discrimination.5 6
Finally, in Spence v. Washington,57 the Court held that the
display of a United States flag with a removable peace sign at-
tached to it was conduct protected under the first amendment."
The Spence decision is particularly significant because, for the
48. Id. at 131.
49. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
50. Id. at 505-06.
51. Id. at 505.
52. Id. at 510.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 510-11.
55. Id. at 510.
56. Id. at 511.
57. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
58. Id. at 414-15.
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first time, the Court formulated a viable framework for deter-
mining whether conduct will be considered "speech" within the
context of the first amendment. In this case, petitioner Spence
hung from the window of his apartment a United States flag
with a large peace sign affixed to it with removable tape. He was
convicted under a Washington statute forbidding the exhibition
of an American flag to which is attached or superimposed
figures, symbols, or other extraneous materials.6 9 Spence claimed
that he had displayed the flag in order to protest both the Kent
State killings (which had occurred a few days earlier) and the
American invasion of Cambodia.6 The Court reversed Spence's
conviction, after finding that Spence had engaged in a form of
communication without the use of spoken or printed word."1
In order to determine whether Spence's activity was "suffi-
ciently imbued with the elements of communication to fall
within the scope of the First and Fourteenth amendments, ''" 2
the Court examined "the nature of the activity, combined with
the factual context and environment in which it was under-
taken."'68 Applying these principles to Spence, the Court said
that the nature of his activity was the displaying of a flag with a
peace symbol affixed as a protest." The historical context for
the protest was the Cambodian invasion and the recent Kent
State massacre. According to the Court, this context gave mean-
ing to the symbol." The Court held that Spence had engaged in
constitutionally protected activity because "an intent to convey
a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it."'
Although the Spence analytical framework is significant for
ascertaining first amendment protection for symbolic expression,
it is not dispositive. Sometimes, for example, the state's interest
in regulating the conduct is inapposite to the conduct's expres-
59. Id. at 405.
60. Id. at 408.
61. Id. at 414-15.
62. Id. at 409.
63. Id. at 409-10.
64. Id. at 408.
65. Id. at 410-11.
66. Id. It is important to note that in Spence, Spence's flag was privately owned, and
his conduct.took place on private property.
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sive conduct. When this occurs, the Court has applied a balanc-
ing test in which the state's interest in regulating the conduct
may be found to outweigh the protestant's interest in using that
particular mode of expression. This is what happened in U.S. v.
O'Brien6 7 a case that preceded Spence.
O'Brien and several others were arrested for burning their
Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of a court-
house, before a sizable crowd which included F.B.I. agents." He
was convicted for violating a federal statute prohibiting the
knowing destruction or mutilation of a Selective Service certifi-
cate. 19 O'Brien appealed on free speech grounds.7
The Supreme Court asserted that "when 'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on first
amendment freedoms. '71 Thus, the test enunciated by the Court
in O'Brien to determine whether a governmental regulation is
sufficiently justified is: 1) Is the regulation within the constitu-
tional power of the government? 2) If so, does it further an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest? 3) If so, is the gov-
ernmental interest which the regulation seeks to promote
unrelated to the suppression of free expression? 4) If so, is the
incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms no
greater than is essential to further that governmental interest?72
In O'Brien, the Court found all of the requirements were satis-
fied and thus found the regulation sufficiently justified.s
The application of the O'Brien test poses some problems.
The first prong of the test (that the regulation be within the
constitutional power of the government) rarely poses a prob-
lem.74 However, the second prong (that the regulation further an
important or substantial governmental interest) may present a
problem. Because such words as "important" and "substantial"
may be interpreted in a variety of ways, the Court in O'Brien
67. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
68. Id. at 369.
69. Id. at 370.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 376.
72. Id. at 377.
73. Id.
74. Watt 11, 703 F.2d at 614 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
listed such adjectives as "compelling; subordinating; paramount;
cogent; strong"7 5 to describe the nature of the governmental in-
terest in regulating the non-speech element of expressive con-
duct which can justify curtailment of first amendment rights. If
one assumes that this list is exhaustive, mere governmental or
administrative convenience could never pass constitutional mus-
ter as far as first amendment treatment is concerned.
Since O'Brien, there have been a number of Supreme Court
cases that involve the second prong of the test.7 6 In one such
case, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness, 7 7 the Court upheld a state regulation that provided that
anyone who wished to sell or distribute merchandise (including
printed material) or solicit funds at the Minnesota State Fair
must do so only from an assigned booth.7 8 The International So-
ciety for Krishna Consciousness (ISKON) objected to the regu-
lation on first amendment grounds.79 The Court, however, found
a significant governmental interest in protecting the "safety and
convenience" of fairgoers, and the "orderly movement of the
crowd."80 Also, after finding the fairground to be a public forum,
the Court found the governmental interest in public safety par-
ticularly substantial and narrowly drawn.8
The third prong of O'Brien (that the governmental interest
be unrelated to the suppression of free expression) has been in-
terpreted to mean that any curtailment of free expression must
be incidental to the prevention of a harm which would result
whether or not the message is conveyed.2 If the harm that a
75. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
76. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
647-48 (1981); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976); and, Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535
(1980).
77. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
78. Id. at 643.
79. Id. at 644-45. Specifically, ISKON sought injunctive relief prohibiting enforce-
ment of the rule against their members. They asserted that the rule would suppress the
practice of Sankirtan, one of its religious rituals, which enjoins its members to go into
public places to distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the sup-
port of their religion.
80. Id. at 649-51.
81. Id. at 654-55.
82. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (Attempts to prevent lit-
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state seeks to prevent arises solely because of the communicative
nature of the conduct, the regulation will fail the third prong of
O'Brien.
The fourth prong of O'Brien (that the restriction on free ex-
pression be no greater than necessary to the furtherance of the
governmental interest) has been interpreted in at least two dif-
ferent ways. One interpretation, the "weak construction," merely
requires that there be no less restrictive alternative which could
achieve the government's objective as efficiently as does the
challenged regulation."8 The other interpretation, which is more
favorable to those seeking first amendment protection, balances
the value of the first amendment freedom against the loss in effi-
ciency to the governmental objective if the Government is forced
to utilize a less restrictive alternative. 4
Notwithstanding the substantial impact that O'Brien and
Spence have made on first amendment free-speech analysis,
there is yet another class of cases that are equally significant.
These are the cases that deal with time, place, and manner
restrictions.
The first amendment does not give absolute protection to
every individual to communicate whenever or wherever he or she
pleases.8 5 Nor does it ensure to anyone the freedom to use any
method of communication in any circumstances.8 6 Even expres-
sive activities that fall within the confines of the first amend-
ment may be subject to reasonable "time, place, and manner"
restrictions.8 7 Generally, the Supreme Court looks for three basic
requirements in such restrictions. These are: 1) the regulation
must be content neutral; 2) the regulation must serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest; and 3) there must be an available
tering by prohibiting the distribution of handbills. Whether or not the handbills convey
a message is irrelevant to the purpose of the regulation); Kovac v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (Purpose of the ban on sound trucks was to prevent excess noise, not to suppress
free expression); and, Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categoriza-
tion and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 38 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1483-84 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Ely].
83. Ely, supra note 82, at 1484-85.
84. Id. at 1482-1490.
85. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647-48; Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3069.
86. Heffron at 647-48; Clark at 3069.
87. Tacynec v. Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 819.
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alternative channel of communication."8 Although it had been
initially discussed some 43 years ago, 9 the time, place, and man-
ner concept has only recently resurfaced. The exact holding of
the Heffron decision was based on such an analysis.90 First, the
Minnesota regulation in Heffron was content-neutral, said the
Court, in that it did not serve to regulate the content of the
speech."' Second, according to the Court, the regulation served a
significant governmental interest in crowd control.9 2 Lastly, the
Court found that the regulation left open alternative channels
for the communication of the desired information.9
When the Court does consider time, place, and manner re-
strictions, it looks to see if the regulation furthers a certain gov-
ernmental interest. An "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression. '94 In other words, the government must show that
the forbidden conduct would actually and substantially interfere
with the government's objective."
The characteristics of the situs or "forum" where the partic-
ular expressive conduct will take place must also be considered
when engaging in time, place, and manner analysis.6 The logical
nexus between the two was shown in United States v. Grace.a7
Grace and others were informed by police officers that their ac-
tions in carrying signs or distributing leaflets on the public side-
walks around the Supreme Court building violated a federal
statute which made it unlawful to "display. . . any flag, banner,
or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any
party, organization, or movement."98 Grace challenged that stat-
88. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647-48.
89. Cox, 312 U.S. at 569.
90. Heifron, 452 U.S. at 647-55.
91. Id. at 649.
92, Id. at 650-51.
93, Id. at 654-55. The Court stated that the rule does not prevent ISKON from prac-
ticing Sankirtan anywhere outside the fairgrounds. ISKON members may mingle with
the crown and orally propagate their views, and they may arrange for a booth and dis-
tribute and sell literature and solicit funds from that location on the grounds.
94. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
95. Id. at 508-09.
96. Id.
97. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
98. Id. at 173-74.
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ute on first amendment free speech grounds."" The Court, noting
that public sidewalks-even those surrounding the Supreme
Court building-have traditionally been considered to be public
forum property, held that reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions apply.'00 Here, however, because that statute called
for a total ban on expressive conduct outside the Supreme Court
building, it could not be upheld unless it was narrowly drawn to
accomplish a compelling governmental interest.' 0' The govern-
ment's interest in protecting the Court from outside influence or
preventing it from appearing to the public that the Court was
subject to such influence was not particularly compelling.'0 2
It was against this formidable amalgamation of first amend-
ment balancing tests that the Supreme Court chose to consider
the interests at stake for CCNV and the government in Clark v.
Community for Creative Non- Violence.'0 3
III. THE DECISION
In his majority opinion, Justice White began by agreeing
with the court of appeals that the proposed overnight sleeping in
tents by CCNV was expressive conduct that was, to some extent,
protected by the first amendment.' 0' However, the assumption
of constitutional protection merely began the Court's inquiry. 0 5
The Court then proceeded to apply the reasonable time,
place, and manner test to the Park Service restrictions. 00 The
respondents contended that the regulations were discriminato-
rily apply because the Park Service had permitted two previous
sleeping demonstrations. 07 CCNV therefore asserted an equal
99. Id. at 174-76.
100. Id. at 177.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 183.
103. Clark, 104 S.Ct. at 3065.
104. Id. at 3068-69. In a footnote, the Court rejected the court of appeals' plurality
suggestion that the burden on the respondent (CCNV) is limited to "the advancement of
a plausible contention" that their conduct is expressive (Citing Watt 11, 703 F.2d at 593
n.16). The Court stated that although it is common to place the burden upon the govern-
ment to justify impingement on first amendment rights, it is the obligation of the person
desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to demonstrate that the first amend-
ment even applies. Id. at 3069 n.5.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Respondent's Opening Brief at 17-18, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
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protection claim.10 8 The Court averred that respondents had
presented only "isolated instances of undiscovered violations of
the regulations."' 10 9 The Court in turn agreed with the govern-
ment that the regulations forbidding sleeping met the tests of
Heffron and its progeny."10
The content-neutrality test is met, said the Court, because
the prohibition on camping was not being applied because of
disagreement with the message CCNV wished to convey."' The
building of the symbolic city, the holding of signs, and the pres-
ence of those who wished to demonstrate in a day-night vigil left
the demonstration wholly intact." 2
The government's substantial interest test is also met, said
the Court." 3 Indeed, the Court agreed with petitioner's argu-
ment that if the respondent and the demonstrators were to sleep
in these national parks, it would create a threat to park
beauty."" The Court also emphasized the government's substan-
tial interest in park maintenance. According to the majority of
the Court, to permit camping would be totally inimical to the
purpose of keeping the parks attractive and intact, readily avail-
able to the throngs of people who wish to use and enjoy them. 1 5
While the Court did not specifically explore the available
alternatives test, it alluded to possible alternatives such as hav-
ing the respondents "take their turns in a day-and-night vigil"
in the national park and "delivering to the media" their in-
Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief]. In May of
1982, about 1,000 Vietnam War veterans were permitted by the Park Service to sleep
overnight in the Mall in order to present a mock war "firebase." The Park Service con-
cluded that the demonstration did not violate the new anti-camping regulations. 36
C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1982) defines camping as: "the use of park land for living accommoda-
tion purposes such as sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep. ... The vet-
eran's conduct does appear to be "sleeping activities" within the meaning of the section.
The second prior occasion occurred in August of 1982 when the Park Service allowed
one dozen Arab women to sleep overnight as part of a vigil and fast to protest the Israeli
blockage of Beirut.
108. Id. at 91 n.50.
109. Clark, 104 S.Ct. at 3070 n.6.
110. Id. at 3070-71.
111. Id. at 3070.
112. Id. at 3070-71.
113. Id. at 3070.
114. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 16-17, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief].
115. Clark, 104 S.Ct. at 3070.
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tended message.11
Next the Court asserted that the major value of sleeping
would have been only facilitative. 1 7 The Court agreed with peti-
tioner's argument that there was no way to tell the difference
between sincere protestors and those who only wished to sleep in
tents for mere shelter. 8 The petitioners contended that the
poor and homeless would participate, or be present at all, only if
they were provided sleeping accommodations.'1 9 As evidence, the
Court cited the very words on respondent's permit application:
"Without the incentive of sleeping or a hot meal, the homeless
would not come to the site. 1 20
The Court then looked beyond the issue at hand, to how the
regulation may be validly applied in future cases. 12 ' The Court
voiced concern that other groups would demand permission to
deliver an asserted message by camping in the parks.122 Other
groups would surely have as credible a claim as respondents, and
to deny permits to some while granting them to others would
cause difficult problems for the Park Service,'23 according to the
majority. Because it believed that the government had a legiti-
mate interest in ensuring that the national parks were ade-
quately protected, the Court held that the regulation was a rea-
sonable restriction on the manner in which a first amendment
demonstration may be carried out. 24
Finally, in a somewhat brief analysis, the Court decided
that the O'Brien test, as applied to the regulations, was satis-
fied. 25 The regulations were "not unconstitutional on their
face"' 2 or "beyond the constitutional power of the government
to enforce.1' 27 Also, as the Court had previously found, the gov-
ernment's interest in preserving park property was substantial.
This interest was served by the measures taken by the Park Ser-
116. Id. See also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 114, at 16-17.
117. Clark, 104 S.Ct. at 3070.
118. Id. See also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 114, at 15.
119. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3070.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 3071.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3072.
126. Id. at 3071.
127. Id. at 3072.
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vice-the proscription of sleeping, except in designated areas. 128
Additionally, the Court found the asserted governmental inter-
est was unrelated to the suppression of expressive conduct.
2 9
The Court disagreed with the court of appeals as to the
fourth prong of the O'Brien test. The court of appeals viewed
the regulation as unnecessary, and therefore invalid, because it
found there were less speech-restrictive alternatives that could
have satisfied the government's interest in park preservation. 30
The court of appeals also suggested that the Park Service could
reduce the size, duration, or frequency of demonstrations,
thereby minimizing the threat of possible injury to the parks.'
According to the Supreme Court, however, this amounted to no
more than a disagreement with the Park Service over how to
protect the parks or how an acceptable level of preservation is to
be attained." 2 The Supreme Court also asserted that neither
O'Brien nor the traditional time, place, and manner tests gave
the judiciary any authority to replace the Park Service as over-
seer of the nation's parks, or endowed the judiciary with the
competence to judge the quantum of protection wisely pre-
scribed by the Park Service.' 3
Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, asserted that what
the respondents called speech is, in reality, conduct and that re-
spondents were therefore "picketing" in the park.1 4 In his view,
because they were picketing, they were interfering with the
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. See also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 114, at 16-18. The government's major
argument was indeed the threat to park beauty. They asserted that the prohibition was
well-suited and narrowly-tailored to the end of preserving the parks for their unique and
multifarious uses. The majority relied on this argument.
133. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3072.
134. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice relied on Justice Black's con-
currence in Cox v. New Hampshire, 379 U.S. 536, 578 (1965):
The first and fourteenth amendments ... take away from government...
all power to restrict freedom of speech ... and assembly where people have a
right to be for such purposes .... Picketing is not speech, and therefore is not
of itself protected by the first amendment.
As indicated in the text (the sentence following footnote 134), the Chief Justice in-
terpreted CCNV's activities as picketing, and therefore, as unprotected first amendment
conduct.
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rights of others to use the parks for their intended purposes. 135
The Chief Justice pointed out that while the constitution guar-
antees that people may make "statements," there are other ar-
eas in Washington, D.C. where respondents may make their
statements. By saying this, the Chief Justice summarily dis-
missed respondent's contention that the site chosen was of sig-
nificant importance to them.'36 Finally, the Chief Justice opined
that this entire suit was frivolous and time-consuming. "It trivi-
alizes the first amendment to seek to use it as a shield in the
manner asserted here,"'1 7 said the Chief Justice.
The dissenting opinion, of Justice Marshall, expressed con-
cern that the majority did not seriously consider respondent's
first amendment claims. 38 Also, the dissent saw a misapplica-
tion of the reasonable time, place, and manner test. 9 Specifi-
cally, the dissent interpreted that test as requiring that the gov-
ernmental interest in the preservation of the national parks be
strictly scrutinized to ensure that expressive activity protected
by the first amendment remains free of unnecessary
limitations.1 4 0
First, the activity in question is symbolic speech protected
by the first amendment, said the dissent.14 ' The dissenters,
therefore, took a closer look at the nature of the conduct at issue
and the context in which it would have been displayed. 4 2 They
noted, for example, that the majority never mentioned the out-
come of the case that was litigated under the old Park Service
regulations, that the proposed demonstration was to take place
during the winter season, and that the respondents were particu-
larly careful in choosing their situs.4'4  The dissent concluded
that this augmented respondent's claim of first amendment pro-
tection for their proposed expressive activity.144 Also, while the
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3072-73. See also Respondent's Brief, supra note 107, at 22-23. CCNV's
major argument was that the sites chosen-Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington,
D.C.-were specifically chosen because of their political locale.
137. 104 S. Ct. at 3073.
138. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id., at 3073-74 and at 3072 n.1.
144. Id.
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majority proudly described the historical significance of Lafay-
ette Park and the Mall, they eschewed the fact that this would
be a powerful forum for respondents. When all of this was added
together, the dissent found that CCNV's purpose (to impress
upon the public consciousness in as dramatic a way as possible
the widespread homeless problem) was clearly stated. 145
Citing precedent, the dissent concluded that the sleeping in
the tents in a national park qualified as symbolic speech subject
to first amendment protection. 46 Relying on Spence, the dissent
pointed out the importance of context in determining whether
an act can be regarded as "speech."14 7 The dissent believed that
the majority should have looked to the intent of the speaker
(whether there was an intent to convey a particularized mes-
sage), and to the perception of the audience (whether the likeli-
hood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it). 48 Apparently, the majority was swayed by the
petitioner's argument that the symbolic sleeping demonstrations
differed from symbolism presented in the Stromberg, Brown,
and Tinker cases. According to the majority, in the case at bar,
sleeping conveys no emotions, no opinions, and no ideas, while
in the previous cases, the conduct was inherently expressive.4 9
The dissent responded to this by maintaining that while blacks
sitting in a "whites only" library in Louisiana in 1965 was
powerfully expressive, so too is sleeping in a national park over-
night to demonstrate the plight of the homeless. 150 Sleeping,
when looked at from this particular context, is quite symbolic,
said the dissent.' 51
Second, the dissent dismissed the government's argument
that it would be impossible to distinguish bona fide protestors
from imposters who simply desire to sleep in the park.152 As the
respondents pointed out, government agents would have made
valid inquiries as to the good faith and sincerity of the individu-
145. Id. at 3074.
146. Id. at 3074-75.
147. Id. at 3075.
148. Id.
149. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 114, at 21-22. This was another of the govern-
ment's major arguments.
150. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3075.
151. Id. at 3076.
152. Id. at 3075-76.
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als involved.15 3 Also, according to the dissent, any administrative
difficulties the Park Service envisioned, in the absence of proof,
would be nothing more than a vague apprehension.'
Third, the dissent strongly asserted that the regulations, as
applied to the respondents, failed to satisfy the reasonable time,
place, and manner test.155 For example, the dissent stated that
although the government's interest in park maintenance is sub-
stantial, neither the government nor the majority could explain
why prohibiting respondent's planned activity would substan-
tially further that interest.156 Clearly, the dissent interpreted the
substantial governmental interest requirement in a stricter sense
than did the majority.
The dissenters also saw flaws in the government's conten-
tion that the ban on sleeping relieved the government of an ad-
ministrative burden, and that the ban would increase the
probability that the purpose of the regulation, to limit wear and
tear on park properties, would be materially served.15 7 The flaw,
said the dissent, is that neither the majority nor the government
presented factual evidence that would evince a real and not a
speculative problem. 5 8 No evidence was presented indicating
that symbolic sleeping would cause substantial wear and tear on
park property. In sum, the dissent contended that "all that the
Court's decision advances are the prerogatives of a bureaucracy
that over the years has shown an implacable hostility toward cit-
izens' exercise of first amendment rights.' 5 9
The majority's minimal scrutiny of "content-neutral" gov-
ernmental regulations particularly disturbed the dissenters. 60
The dissent believed that once the, Court narrowly limited its
concern to whether a given regulation creates a content-based
distinction, it overlooked the fact that content-neutral restric-
tions are also capable of unnecessarily restricting protected ex-
153. Respondent's Brief, supra note 114, at 80.
154. Clark, 104 S.Ct. at 3076.
155. Id. at 3077-78.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 3078.
158. Id. (citing U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); and Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3079.
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pressive activity.'0 ' An essential tool of first amendment analysis
is the general prohibition against content-based regulations. The
dissent contended that it helps to put into operation the tenet
that "government may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to
express less favored or more controversial views." '162
Lastly, the dissenters were distressed at the assumptions
made by the majority regarding those who formulate and admin-
ister content-neutral regulations. What is alarming to the dis-
sent is that the Court assumed that the balance struck is deserv-
ing of deference so long as it does not appear to be tainted by
content discrimination. 6 8 That is, the dissent averred that "the
Court fails to recognize . . . that public officials have strong in-
centives to overregulate even in the absence of an intent to cen-
sor particular views."' 6' Typically, public officials try to accom-
modate two groups: the general public and those who seek to use
a particular forum for first amendment purposes.'65 Yet the po-
litical power of the mainstream population is likely to be far
greater than that of those who fall into the latter group.'66 In
fact, the dissent noted that there is a substantial possibility in
the case at bar that the impetus behind the revision may have
derived less from concerns about administrative difficulties and
wear on the park facilities, than from other, more political con-
cerns. 167 The dissent stated outright that the case litigated
under the old Park Service regulations which favored the re-
spondents, and involved the same parties and issues, was the im-
petus that the Park Service needed. 16 The alleged need for
more restrictive regulations, therefore, seemed to be based on
pretext.6 9 Thus, there was more than enough evidence in this
case to have impelled the Court to subject the government's re-
161. Id. See, e.g., Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981).
162. Id. (citing Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, at 95-96
(1972)).
163. Id. at 3080.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Goldberger, supra note 41, at 208).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. ld., at 3080 n.17.
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strictive policy to something more than mere minimal
scrutiny.' 70
CONCLUSION
The Clark decision, even if read narrowly and confined to
its specific facts, will have an obvious "chilling effect" on legiti-
mate organizations and individuals wishing to employ the spe-
cial symbolism of symbolic speech in public forums.'
The Court's analysis, however, sheds light on how this deci-
sion will effect future first amendment free-speech cases. For ex-
ample, the four prong O'Brien test and the reasonable time,
place, and manner test apparently have been blurred into a sin-
gle hybrid test. 172 This test may very well be the new standard
that must be met when deciding whether a regulation is in con-
flict with an individual's or organization's first amendment
rights. Also, the Court's minimal scrutiny of governmental regu-
lations that they deem "content-neutral" evinces a trend that
will shift the balance in favor of the governmental entity, at the
expense of the group asserting first amendment protection.
Christopher J. Marengo
170. Id.
171. Clark will have an impact on the past decisions (albeit few in number) dealing
with the unique symbolism of sleeping. See, e.g., A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, C.A.
No. 688-89 (D.C. Cir. 1971), (cited in Vietnam Veterans Against the War v. Morton, 506
F.2d 53, 54 n.1. (D.C. Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Abney, 534 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
172. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3076 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority
that there was no substantial difference that distinguishes the reasonable time, place,
and manner test from the test articulated in O'Brien, 319 U.S. 367).
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